Staging · not public, not indexed Drafts: The Problem with a Free Lamborghini… It Works!
Power Law Performance
Research library

Selection bias and paradoxes

Why do you only see the customers you let in, and why do averages reverse?

Heckman (1979)

James J. Heckman, "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica 47, no. 1 (1979): 153–161. doi:10.2307/1912352

What it found

Bias from "non-randomly selected samples" is a form of omitted-variable bias, and it can be corrected with a two-step estimator. This is part of the work behind his 2000 Nobel ("for his development of theory and methods for analyzing selective samples").

Why it matters

A model trained only on approved or closed deals inherits the selection that produced them.

Lakkaraju, Kleinberg, Leskovec, Ludwig & Mullainathan (2017)

"The Selective Labels Problem: Evaluating Algorithmic Predictions in the Presence of Unobservables," Proceedings of KDD '17 (2017): 275–284. doi:10.1145/3097983.3098066

What it found

When outcomes are seen only for cases a human approved (bail, loans), you can still evaluate a model by using the differences between lenient and strict decision-makers ("contraction").

Why it matters

You never see outcomes for the files you declined or the leads reps skipped. Differences between underwriters or reps are your natural experiment.

Hand & Henley (1993; 1997): reject inference

David J. Hand and William E. Henley, "Can Reject Inference Ever Work?" IMA Journal of Mathematics Applied in Business and Industry 5, no. 1 (1993): 45–55, doi:10.1093/imaman/5.1.45; and "Statistical Classification Methods in Consumer Credit Scoring: A Review," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A 160, no. 3 (1997): 523–541, doi:10.1111/j.1467-985X.1997.00078.x.

What it found

Credit scorecards are built only on approved applicants. "Reject inference" tries to guess how the rejected would have performed, and the 1993 paper asks whether it can ever work. The 1997 paper is the standard review of scoring methods.

Why it matters

The lending industry's name for "you only see the loans you made."

Capen, Clapp & Campbell (1971); Thaler (1988): the winner's curse

E. C. Capen, R. V. Clapp and W. M. Campbell, "Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations," Journal of Petroleum Technology 23, no. 6 (1971): 641–653, doi:10.2118/2993-PA; Richard H. Thaler, "Anomalies: The Winner's Curse," Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, no. 1 (1988): 191–202, doi:10.1257/jep.2.1.191.

What it found

"a lease winner tends to be the bidder who most overestimates reserves potential." Thaler presents evidence that "the winner's curse may be a common phenomenon."

Why it matters

Winning a contested lead, keyword or media auction is bad news about your own estimate. A/B-test winners suffer the same curse (see Lee and Shen, 2018).

Simpson (1951); Bickel, Hammel & O'Connell (1975)

E. H. Simpson, "The Interpretation of Interaction in Contingency Tables," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 13, no. 2 (1951): 238–241, doi:10.1111/j.2517-6161.1951.tb00088.x; P. J. Bickel, E. A. Hammel and J. W. O'Connell, "Sex Bias in Graduate Admissions: Data from Berkeley," Science 187, no. 4175 (1975): 398–404, doi:10.1126/science.187.4175.398.

What it found

Berkeley's combined admissions showed "a clear but misleading pattern of bias against female applicants." Department by department, the data showed "a small but statistically significant bias in favor of women." Women had applied more to the departments that admitted fewer of anyone.

Why it matters

A blended rate (churn, conversion, approval) can move the opposite way from every segment inside it, because the mix changed.

Note. The name "Simpson's paradox" came later (Blyth, 1972).

Read our explainer

Berkson (1946)

Joseph Berkson, "Limitations of the Application of Fourfold Table Analysis to Hospital Data," Biometrics Bulletin 2, no. 3 (1946): 47–53. doi:10.2307/3002000

What it found

Studying only hospital patients can create "a spurious negative association" between a disease and a risk factor (as summarized secondarily; the paper has no abstract).

Why it matters

Analyze only the deals you won and you'll find trade-offs that don't exist in the market.

Mangel & Samaniego (1984): Wald's bombers

Marc Mangel and Francisco J. Samaniego, "Abraham Wald's Work on Aircraft Survivability," Journal of the American Statistical Association 79, no. 386 (1984): 259–267. doi:10.1080/01621459.1984.10478038

What it found

An exposition of Wald's wartime memos on estimating aircraft vulnerability "using data obtained from survivors."

Why it matters

Your surviving customers hide the reasons the others left.

Note. A caution: the popular version of this story (armor the places with no bullet holes) is embellished. This paper is the documented account of Wald's method.

Read our explainer

New work, as we publish it.

The Power Law Performance newsletter puts this research to work: where volume KPIs pick the wrong winner, and the signals that sort value from volume.

Updates as we publish new work. We’ll only use your email for this newsletter.